Interview to [Dennik N]: By investing in manipulation, Russia is exploiting public skepticism and weakening the social fabric.
This following interview was offered to the Slovak media portal Dennik N. I answer questions related to Russian hybrid warfare in the EU and its neighbourhood.
Dennik N: Misinformation and disinformation was defined by the 2024 Global Report of Risks as the foremost category of short-term risks, even surpassing polarization in societies and extreme weather conditions. Why are misinformation and disinformation so dangerous? Could you explain in a simple way who misinformation and disinformation are such a threat to the world?
Denis Cenusa: The phenomenon of misinformation and disinformation can have a negative impact on the perception of reality by the population of a state. With erroneous or false information, the behavior of citizens can be changed against the national interests of a country. Consequently, citizens' decisions can be altered to the detriment of a country's decision-makers, impacting the course of events. Through distrust of state institutions, citizens may be incited to participate in anti-government protests or vote in a certain way, which does not necessarily contribute to the strengthening of democratic institutions. Misinformation and disinformation serve to undermine the unity or deepen the pre-existing idioms of certain societies and states.
Dennik N: Since Russia started the full scale war against Ukraine, the misinformation and disinformation spread by a foreign entity (basically FIMI) are on the rise. It means that misinformation is manipulated from abroad against a particular country or personality. In which countries have we noticed the highest amount of FIMI since the full scale war in Ukraine? Against who, which politicians?
Denis Cenusa: According to EU estimates, the main target of the disinformation unleashed by Russia after February 2022 was Ukraine and its leader Volodymyr Zelensky. Furthermore, among EU leaders, disinformation was often directed against Olaf Scholz and Emmanuel Macron. Two aspects counted in the formulation of the misinforming narrative. First, the target has to represent a country that supports Ukraine, and second, the targeted leaders come from an influential country, such as Germany or France.
Dennik N: Has Russian propaganda aimed at post soviet countries ever since the fall of the Soviet Union? What was the Kremlin's goal?
Denis Cenusa: Certainly, Russia has used disinformation in the post-Soviet space and against formerly Soviet-ruled countries. If the initial objective seemed to be the creation of a positive perception of Russia, currently it seeks rather to reduce public trust in national governments and disrupt regional geopolitical processes, such as European enlargement.
Dennik N: In which post soviet countries can we see the highest amount of Russian propaganda and why these particular countries?
Denis Cenusa: The presence of Russian propaganda in former Soviet-ruled countries varies and that depends on the strength of the Russian language and the functionality of pro-Russian communication channels. There is no study that comparatively evaluates in which country Russian propaganda is more powerful, but Russian aggression against Ukraine makes the latter the most exposed country. Moldova and Armenia are next, while Belarus and the Central Asian countries are also prone to Russian disinformation, although of a less incisive nature because Moscow is not afraid of losing control over them.
Dennik N: How is Russian propaganda disseminated in post soviet countries? Which ways and canals does it use? Social media? Which social media?
Denis Cenusa: The ways in which Russian propaganda is disseminated have been evolving taking into account changes in the communicative behavior of audiences in the post-Soviet space. As traditional Russian media have been losing space due to legal restrictions or sanctions, Russian propaganda has migrated to social networks, mainly on Telegram, VKontakte and Odnoklasniki. This does not mean that Russian narratives are not penetrating Facebook, with the help of different proxy actors, such as pro-Russian politicians and media outlets, etc.
Dennik N: Is it a hybrid war? How do you define a hybrid war?
Denis Cenusa: Hybrid warfare can be defined as an unconventional form of warfare, which can take place in times of war and peace, and is used to exploit the weaknesses of a state at the level of institutions, political areas or even societies. Hybrid warfare relies on detection and attribution difficulties, including because it can be performed by state and non-state actors. The more sudden hybrid attacks are, the more difficult it is to anticipate and manage them. That causes further damage by diverting state resources from pre-arranged emergencies and inflaming public grievances about the legitimacy of national governments.
Dennik N: Paradoxically, Russia manipulates information in several countries, manipulates the elections in several countries, spreads misinformation and wages a hybrid war, but it is Russia saying that "foreign agents" want to destroy their morally beautiful regime with a society full of traditional families. What is the difference between Russia manipulating information space in other countries, and Western or EU financing of independent NGOs?
Denis Cenusa: By investing in manipulation, Russia is exploiting public skepticism and discontent, leading to the weakening of the social fabric that will influence the quality of governance, opening space for populism, corruption and fragmentation. When the EU and the West invest in the democratic development of states, they usually do so by supporting reforms and civil society organisations. This is supposed to consolidate partnerships. Therefore, the political independence of NGOs and the integrity of reforms are important in the effort to build resilient societies that are capable of resisting Russian disinformation attempts.
Dennik N: In Slovakia, the ruling coalition wants to pass a bill similar to foreign agents' Russian law. Basically, it is the same law but they haven't come so far to call the NGOs foreign agents. They call them "organisations with foreign support". In Georgia, the Russian foreign agent's law has been passed in two readings. How does the ruling Georgian Dream party justify this kind of law - as a step towards transparency?
Denis Cenusa: Governments like the one we see in Georgia are aware that NGOs are enablers of norms and can educate the population to follow democratic patterns of behavior, especially before elections. When the public no longer trusts state institutions because they consider them controlled by informal actors (oligarchs, etc.), NGOs are given more credibility. Respectively, instead of consolidating the independence of institutions, guaranteeing accountability and the rule of law, the governments are choosing to go after NGOs, which are perceived as internal political enemies.
Dennik N: Transparency International Georgia says the adoption of the bill which is called by the opposition "Russian law" is not "transparency but the change of the country's foreign course and the completion of Russification". Do you agree?
Denis Cenusa: The law on foreign agents passed in two readings in Georgia is similar to the 2012 law in Russia in terms of stigmatization and sanctioning of NGOs receiving funding from abroad. There are legitimate fears that, as in the case of Russia, the law could be tightened further, inhibiting civil society, silencing it or even driving it into exile. Reducing the space for NGOs cannot be good for the development of democratic culture in Georgia, bringing it closer to the situation in Russia and Azerbaijan.
Dennik N: The Georgian Dream Party which has been in power since 2012 suggested that the country's opposition was controlled by foreign intelligence services. How do the general public react to this disinformation? Is the Georgian public vulnerable towards the hybrid war?
Denis Cenusa: Georgia has a vibrant civil society and a very active young segment of the population, particularly in urban areas. In these two categories of population, which can sometimes overlap, there is free circulation of information and pluralism of opinions. Still, the polarization that exists in Georgia pushes people into different camps and can create certain opportunities for a Russian hybrid warfare that is most effective in divided societies. Consequently, it is commendable that the ongoing protests in Georgia speak of unity and try to create the flag effect using the prospect of European integration as an incentive.
Dennik N: What do you think about the level of police violence in Georgia as a reaction to peaceful protests? How should the EU react? Brussels has already expressed its feelings about the situation in Georgia but you proposed the scenario of warning Georgia to cancel its candidate status. Do you think this could help?
Denis Cenusa: The police should act proportionally to the real risk of public disorder. Since the protests are peaceful, the police should react accordingly. The EU has a difficult dilemma to navigate because it fears that by punishing the Georgian government it could be responsible for its greater tilt towards Russia. There is no political will in Brussels to withdraw Georgia's candidate status. However, the EU can still warn with such a negative perspective to show the costs of adopting the toxic bill, which protesters can then use to mobilize for the upcoming general election, which may be significantly influenced by the current political crisis in Georgia.
Dennik N: How is it possible the government is not worried about this option? Do they need the EU? Or do they rely on Baku, maybe the Kremlin for economic stability?
Denis Cenusa: Because of the government's openness toward Baku, Ankara, Moscow, and even Beijing, the Georgian ruling party is eager to take greater risks when it comes to protests against the bill. It would be completely unimaginable to see such a scenario, if Georgia were dependent on the EU in terms of participation in energy exports, remittances or exports. To a large extent, the Georgia government's current behavior is a combination of the EU's previous mistakes in not applying conditionality efficiently and the government's abilities to diversify its relationships with different regional and global actors that allow it to act more autonomously in relation to the EU and against the norms expected of a candidate state.
Dennik N: What about Moldova? Which Moldovan region is more targeted: Transnistria or Gagauzia? Why is Gagauzia interesting for the Kremlin?
Denis Cenusa: Both regions are exposed to Russian narratives, but Gagauzia plays a bigger role these days because it can serve as a spoiler for the upcoming presidential elections. Despite the small size of the population (less than 150,000), it is a united minority that can act orderly in reaction to policies adopted by central authorities. The difficulty for the Moldovan government is to treat the authorities of the autonomous region and the Gagauz population separately. While the authorities are linked to rogue groups, led by the fugitive businessman Ilan Shor, operating from Moscow, ordinary people have their own agenda and can be persuaded to switch sides if the right incentives are offered.
Dennik N: What about people like Yevgenia Gutsul? Are they paid from Russia? Are they ideologically really persuaded about their truths, or are they just useful idiots?
Denis Cenusa: These political actors emerged accidentally in Moldovan politics and will most likely disappear when their term ends. The most likely interest that moves them is material, as well as the objective of obtaining legal immunity. It's a challenge to consider them useful idiots because they are very aware of what they do and they don't do it for free. If they are not paid directly by Shor, actors other than those of Russian origin interested in remunerating them will not be able to receive remuneration.
Dennik N: In her speech, Yevgenia Gutsul attacked LGBTQ+ rights, and she criticised Europe for legalising gay marriages. Is LGBTQ+ a strong part of Russian disinformation agenda? How do the Moldovan public react to it? Are LGBTQ+ people stigmatised in Moldova?
Denis Cenusa: All these attacks on the LGBT community and other rights that are promoted within the EU are nothing more than a replication of Russian narratives to bring them to the media and public space in Moldova. In recent years, to show its alignment with EU good practices in the field of human rights, the Moldovan government has made efforts to guarantee the rights of sexual minorities in accordance with national legislation, which was adapted in 2012 regime with the EU.
Dennik N: What needs to be done to fight the Russian misinformation campaigns? We have a big problem with it in Slovakia too. The biggest problem is that the government is the one spreading the Russian propaganda. Who can do something about it? How?
Denis Cenusa: States facing Russian disinformation and propaganda have to find remedies that do not have immediate and comprehensive effects, but that strengthen society's resilience against external malign influence. First, the state must communicate strategically with the public, responsibly and intelligently communicating state policies and how they benefit the people. Without trust between the state and citizens, the latter will look for answers elsewhere and will become victims of speculation and misinformation. And secondly, what disinformation is must be explained to the population, but instilling critical thinking and presenting the costs and benefits of the decisions adopted by the state. Hiding problematic aspects can help Russian narratives convince the population that something important is being hidden from them. Critical thinking and frank communication from the state to the people will disarm the Russian attempt at disinformation.
Interview realized by Kristina Böhmer for the Slovak media portal Dennik N. Here is the text in Slovak.