Explainer - 15: Unpacking the Russian scenarios of influencing Moldova and the lack of parallels with Belarus

Some old Russian plans to influence Moldova have been circulating recently. Their authenticity is undeniable. But their likelihood in the current geopolitical and national context of Moldova.

Russia's plans to increase its influence over Moldova have changed in the last 2 years. Before the start of the war against Ukraine, Moscow sought one thing in Moldova, but it had to act differently when things went out of its control.

Here I explain why & how:

1) The document on Russia’s political influence in Moldova was prepared before Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine. The geopolitical context has changed dramatically, which means that the plan drawn up in 2021 is not feasible or implementable;

2) Initially, Moscow's goal was to push pro-Russian forces to power by means of "soft power" (gas dependence, creation of networks of non-governmental organizations);

3) The goal of destabilization as part of a hybrid war emerged after the 2021 early elections (the victory of pro-EU forces) and was fully unleashed in 2022 (all 4 elements of hybrid warfare - DIME), when military aggression against Ukraine took the form of a full-scale war.

4) Given that Russia already knew in 2021 that it wanted to attack Ukraine and create a land corridor to Transnistria (Novorossija), it launched a hybrid war (weaponization of gas dependence) against Moldova in the fall of 2021 as part of this plan.

5) Later, after losing military ground in Ukraine, Russia changed the direction of the hybrid war against Moldova to (a) undermine Ukraine's military focus on defense against Russian forces and (b) discredit the pro-EU government in favor of pro-Russian ones ahead the elections in 2023-25.

Here are some additional reflections:

The difference between Russian plans for Belarus and Moldova

• The main reason why Russian plans regarding Moldova look weaker or less ambitious can be because of the pro-EU forces that are in power at least until the legislative elections in 2025. Another reason can be the geographical and geopolitical proximity of Belarus, which before the 2020 democratic protests was still mimicking a sort of balancing act between Russia and the West.

Russia wants to ensure military cooperation with Moldovan: was that possible?

• The goal of cooperation between Moldova and Russia in the field of military or between the armed forces is not something that can be feasible at all. Moldova is not part of CSTO as for instance Belarus or Armenia and in the last two years, especially after the Russian aggression against Ukraine broke out, Moldova has intensified its cooperation both with the EU and NATO.

Russia wanted a Consulate General in Comrat (Gagauzia) by 2022: how feasible was/is that?

• The request to open a Russian consulate in Comrat first time came from the Gagauz leadership in 2014, and before that from Igor Dodon in 2012, but has never materialized. On the other hand, Turkey set up a general consulate in Comrat in 2020. Consequently, Russian failure to do so can be explained by the opposition of Chisinau which should give a “green light” for this.

How successful is Russia in creating and backing a network of Russia-friendly NGOs in Moldova?

• The Russia-friendly organizations were rather invisible before the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022. An exception from the rule was the Russian-Moldova Business Association which was headed by Igor Dodon and was promoting consolidating the economic ties with Russia (creating dependencies). Today, promoting a friendly narrative about Russia can lead to serious troubles with law enforcement and special services and lead to public cancellation.

Russia’s hybrid war in Moldova is less strong than expected

• Moldova is more resilient against the elements of the Russian hybrid war. The media regulator is surveilling and curtailing the presence of pro-Russia propaganda. Law enforcement agencies are receiving assistance from the EU and NATO member states. However, there are still risks related to the Transnistrian region, the disinformation that reaches out via the internet, and cyber-attacks or the forms of psychological warfare through false bomb alerts. In addition to that, the consequences of the energy crises are exploited by the opposition forces that are linked to Russia and whose political agenda corresponds with Russian geopolitical goals in Moldova.

Russia’s intentions to curb Romania’s presence in Moldova

• Russia can try to curtail the bilateral dialogue of Moldova with Romania or NATO only if pro-Russian political forces are elected in the legislative and executive branches of power. The low public approval of the ruling party and the president in Moldova due to the decline in living standards, caused by the energy crisis and the consequences of the war, is used by the pro-Russian opposition to increasing their visibility. If the popularity of the pro-EU forces will not bounce back, the pro-Russian parties will pose a higher risk in the next electoral cycles.

Moldova’s dependency on Russia in the trade and energy field

• Moldova is more energy resilient in 2023 than it was in the past two years. It can import gas from Romania, and the EU via Ukraine and through the Trans-Balkan pipeline through reverse flow. The only problem is the price of gas and complications related to the electricity that Chisinau buys from the Transnistrian region, which is produced from Russian gas. Other than that, Moldova is more confident, which also helps the strategic gas reserves in Ukraine and Romania. Russian trade fell under 10%, which may seem insignificant. However, there are some imports that Russia can still weaponize to cause political costs to the government in Chisinau. This refers to the agri-food exports (apples) to Russia, which were restricted last year.

Russia wanted to “reduce the share of third-country currencies in foreign trade settlements of Russia and Moldova: how did it play out?

• According to the last contract signed between Moldova and Gazprom in 2021, the payment for gas can be made in dollars, rubles, and euros. However, as Moldova is not fully and officially aligned with the Western sanctions, Russia did not include Moldova in the “unfriendly list of countries” that were forced to pay according to the Russian ruble-based payment mechanism. Nevertheless, in May 2022, Moldovan authorities expressed an interest to pay for gas in euros because rubles were very volatile, but they continued to make the payment in dollars until December.